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INTRODUCTION
Discounting, "[t]he procedure for determining the present value of a fu-
ture dollar,"' has long been recognized as a crucial element in the calculation
of tort damages. Following decades of application by state courts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the notion that future economic
losses must be discounted to present-day value first received express en-
dorsement from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916.3 In the ninety years that
followed, the use of discount rates in computing tort damages became firmly
established in American jurisprudence and widely practiced by courts.4
More recently, discounting has also become indispensable to the executive
branch of the federal government in the economic analysis of its regula-
tions.5 Since 1981, when President Reagan's Executive Order 12291 first
mandated cost-benefit analysis for all major federal regulations,6 federal
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
have routinely discounted and compared future costs and benefits to study
the impact and desirability of proposed regulations
Discounting has intuitive appeal. As Judge Posner writes, "To most peo-
ple, a dollar today is worth a great deal more than a dollar ten years from
now."8 There are two reasons this is the case: opportunity cost, because a
dollar today can be invested, and pure time preference, because individuals
are generally impatient.9 By converting a future dollar into its present-day
equivalent, discounting enables us to aggregate and compare values across
1. B. PETER PASHIGIAN, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 552 (1995).
2. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 493-94 (1916) (noting that it was a
common practice among state courts to discount future payments to present value when determining
damage awards).
3. Id. at 490-92 (holding that, when computing a lump-sum award, lost future earnings of
the deceased must be discounted to their present value).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1979) ("The measure of a lump-sum
award for future pecuniary losses arising from a tort is the present worth of the full amount of the
loss of what would have been received at the later time.").
5. Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory
Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1998).
6. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 10 (2002).
7. Morrison, supra note 5, at 1336-37.
8. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 2002).
9. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 84.
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different time periods.'0 In the classic model of discounting, the formula for
making such a conversion from the future to the present is:
Vt
(1+ r)'
where vt is the future value in year t, r is the discount rate, and ut is the pre-
sent value of v." Cost-benefit analysis applies this formula to compute the
present value of future costs and benefits of a proposed project or regula-
tion.'2 Under the Net Present Value ("NPV") test, an activity is worthwhile if
and only if it has a positive net present value, defined as the difference be-
tween the present value of benefits and the present value of costs.'3 A
negative net present value indicates that the activity costs more than its
benefits and therefore fails the cost-benefit analysis.
4
Despite its intuitive appeal and simple mathematical formulation, the
use of discounting in cost-benefit analysis remains a subject of heated aca-
demic debate,'5 at the center of which is the difficulty of determining the
appropriate discount rate. '6 The classic model of discounting predicts a con-
stant discount rate equal to the real market interest rate," but scholars have
since identified a number of other factors affecting the discount rate, such as
risk premium, social preference, and ethical implications. 8 From a theoreti-
cal perspective, even though scholars generally agree that the discount rate
depends on more than the interest rate alone, they disagree on the extent to
10. Coleman Bazelon & Kent Smetters, Discounting in the Long Term, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
277, 277 (2001) ("Discounting addresses the problem of translating values from one time period to
another.").
11. Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates,
Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 277-78 (1993). If the discount
compounds continuously instead of annually, the formula becomesv', = ve-". EDWARD M. GRAM-
LICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 113 (2d ed. 1990).
12. Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 11, at 278.
13. Id. For a more detailed introduction to the NPV test, see MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN
SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 116-19 (2003).
14. Morrison, supra note 5, at 1342.
15. See, e.g., John J. Donohue IfI, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Dis-
count Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901 (1999) (defending cost-benefit analysis); Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) (criticizing the use of regula-
tory cost-benefit analysis). For a review of the main critiques of cost-benefit analysis, see Robert W.
Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021,
1024-31 (2004), and Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 201-10 (2004).
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1711 (2001)
("Perhaps the most difficult issue [in a cost-benefit analysis], from the theoretical point of view,
involves the selection of the appropriate discount rate.").
17. IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 13-14 (1930).
18. See infra Part 1.
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which these other factors influence the discount rate.' 9 Some contend that
one should not discount nonmonetary "future enjoyments" such as human
lives and environmental benefits, ° essentially advocating a discount rate of
zero for such assets.2' Empirical analysis has not fared much better in pro-
ducing a consensus. Various experimental studies observed a range of• 22
behavioral discount rates too wide to provide any practical guidance, fur-
ther confirming the challenge in obtaining an appropriate discount rate for
use with cost-benefit analysis. In practice, federal agencies vary in selecting
discount rates, and even within one agency discount rates may vary from
regulation to regulation "for no apparent reason. 23 Because of the theoreti-
cal controversy and the practical difficulty in ascertaining the appropriate
discount rate, as well as the "extremely erratic" government approach to
choosing a discount rate,24 some scholars have questioned the feasibility and
credibility of cost-benefit analysis,2 noting that even a minute discrepancy
in the estimated discount rate can result in a substantial change in the pre-
sent value of costs and benefits from the distant future.26
This Note does not attempt to resolve the controversy surrounding the
choice of discount rates or the use of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, it builds
on a substantial body of literature that advocates asymmetric discounting-
the use of a lower discount rate when computing the net present value of
benefits than when computing the net present value of the corresponding
costs-and argues that a proper application of asymmetric discount rates
will change the inquiry of cost-benefit analysis from "whether to adopt a
proposed activity" to "when to adopt." Part I of this Note reviews recent
literature on the need for asymmetric discount rates in cost-benefit analysis.
It observes that even though scholars disagree on the precise value of the
appropriate discount rate, many agree that future costs and benefits must be
19. See, e.g., Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1373
(2003) (disagreeing with the 5% discount rate Dr. Hahn used in his studies and suggesting a dis-
count rate between 2% and 3%). See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 83-86.
20. E.g., F.P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 EcON. J. 543, 543 (1928)
("[D]iscount[ing] later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones.., is ethically indefensible and
arises merely from the weakness of the imagination ...."); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regu-
lation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 987-
1009 (1999) (arguing that, in an intergenerational context, one should not discount future life years
and environmental benefits).
21. Morrison, supra note 5, at 1338-39.
22. See, e.g., Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport, & Joseph Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred from
Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGrvrr. Sci. 270 (1989) (estimating the discount rate to be
between 7.5% and 60%, depending on the time horizon and dollar amount involved); Richard
Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 204 (1981)
(finding discount rates ranging from 1% to 345%).
23. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1711-12.
24. Id. at 1712.
25. E.g., Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environ-
mental Law, 90 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1428-29 (2005).
26. K.J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 125, 132 (James P.
Bruce et al. eds., 1996).
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discounted at different rates. Part II then constructs a simple model, consist-
ing of two activities competing for the same resource, and analyzes the
consequences of asymmetric discounting under this model. This Part pro-
poses that, to maximize the joint social utility, the resource should be time
divided between the competing activities rather than permanently allocated
to one or the other. Part III applies this model to nuisance suits between pol-
luters and victims of pollution. This Part argues that, when choosing how to
allocate an entitlement to valuable resources between competing parties,
courts should consider time dividing the remedy instead of permanently
awarding entitlement to one side or the other, as courts traditionally have
done. Likewise, the two categories of rules designed to protect entitlements,
property rules and liability rules, may also be alternated over time to maxi-
mize social utility. Part IV extends the model to augment the traditional
economic analysis of federal environmental regulations. It identifies two
perhaps unintended consequences of applying asymmetric discount rates in
the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations. First, from a pure utility-
maximizing point of view, many federal regulations to which asymmetric
discounting is applicable should be adopted neither now nor never, but
rather at some point in the future. Second, agencies should adopt progres-
sively more stringent regulations over time in order to maintain a maximum
level of social utility.
I. DISCOUNTING BENEFITS AT DIFFERENT RATES
In determining the appropriate discount rate to use with a cost-benefit
analysis, the real interest rate approach serves as a starting point. Introduc-
tory economics and finance textbooks often illustrate the theory of
discounting by using the real interest rate as the discount rate,27 because un-
der perfect market conditions, rational consumers will "equate their
marginal rates of time preference to the rate of interest.' '28 Based on this jus-
tification, and perhaps partially due to the relative ease in calculating the
real interest rate from the return on long-term government bonds, many
courts in this country and other common law jurisdictions have adopted the
real interest rate approach to discounting future cash flows. 29 This Part pro-
vides a brief survey of the large volume of literature that suggests the real
interest rate may not be the appropriate discount rate.
27. E.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 240-41 (7th ed. 2005).
28. Agnar Sandmo & Jacques H. Drbze, Discount Rates for Public Investment in Closed and
Open Economies, 38 ECONOMICA 395, 395 (1971).
29. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 541-42, 548-49 (1983) (noting
that Australian and American courts have taken the "real interest rate" approach to discounting, and
holding that the use of real interest rate discounting by the trial court cannot be a ground for rever-
sal).
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A. Descriptive Approach
The real interest rate approach described above is a simplified version of
what is commonly referred to as the descriptive approach. "The descriptive
approach," as defined by Professor Arrow in his influential 1996 article,
"looks at investments in the real world, and sets the discount rate accord-
ingly."30 Advocates of the descriptive approach "begin[] with evidence from
decisions that people and governments actually make" and infer the dis-
count rate from such evidence.'
Under the descriptive approach, risky future payoffs must be discounted
at a higher rate than risk-free ones. The basic financial principle that "[a]
safe dollar is worth more than a risky one"32 implies that, to be acceptable,
risky projects must be able to earn a higher return than safe projects. Under
this approach, a risk-adjusted discount rate, consisting of the risk-free dis-
count rate plus a risk premium, is appropriate for evaluating uncertain future
benefits.3 3 The risk premium component of the risk-adjusted discount rate is
further divided into specific risk, the risk associated with the unique charac-
teristics of the future cash flow, and systematic risk, the risk associated with
the market as a whole. 34 Because specific risk "stems from the fact that
many of the perils that surround an individual company are peculiar to that
company,' 35 the discount rate used in calculating the present value of a high-
risk cash flow must account for the additional specific risk associated with
that cash flow and is therefore higher than that of a low-risk income
stream.36
Several prominent economists argue that government projects and regu-
lations should be assessed at a low risk premium.37 This argument has two
aspects. First, for any individual government venture, risk is "inevitably
pooled and averaged over the entire population of the country in some fash-
ion, ... without any cost of extra financial transactions. 38 Under proper
assumptions, this reason alone implies that "the government should employ
no risk premium. ' 9 Second, because the government is "involved with so
30. Arrow et al., supra note 26, at 132.
31. Id. at 131.
32. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 18
(6th ed. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 244.
34. Id. at 167 nn.19-20.
35. Id. at 167.
36. "The risk-adjusted discount rate adjusts for both time and risk" Id. at 244. Alternatively,
one could make separate adjustments for risk and time. The certainty-equivalent method first con-
verts a risky future cash flow into a certainty equivalent, then discounts the certainty equivalent flow
by the pure time preference. Id.
37. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 290-91 (3d ed. 2000);
Kenneth J. Arrow, Criteria for Social Investment, 1 WATER RESOURCES RES. I (1965); Dale W.
Jorgenson et al., Discussion, Principles of Efficiency, 54 Am. ECON. REV. 86 (1964).
38. Jorgenson et al., supra note 37, at 89.
39. STIGLrrz, supra note 37, at 291.
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many risky ventures, the law of large numbers ensures an aggregate cer-
tainty."4 As Professor Samuelson concludes, "[o]ften, government is one of
the 'cheapest' ways of providing insurance against important risks.'
Another branch of the descriptive approach to discount rates focuses on
distortions in the economy. Studies have shown that, under certain assump-
tions, distortions such as the corporate income tax "drive[] a wedge between"
the discount rate facing consumers and the discount rate facing private inves-
42tors. As a result, the discount rate applicable to private investment is higher
than that for consumption. The presence of distortions in the economy leads
to yet another argument in favor of assigning a lower discount rate to gov-
ermnent activities than to private investment. Because the discount rate
under the descriptive approach is essentially the opportunity cost of capital,
the discount rate of government projects should be equal to the opportunity
cost of the private consumption and investment they displace. 43 The resulting
government discount rate is thus a weighted average of the consumption
discount rate and the tax-distorted investment discount rate, and therefore
should be lower than that of the private investment discount rate.4
B. Prescriptive Approach
Unlike the descriptive approach, the prescriptive approach to discount-
ing does not base the discount rate on the time preference revealed by
individual and government actions.4 Advocates of this approach argue that
market imperfections and governmental intervention make market interest
rates a poor indicator of marginal tradeoffs to society.4 Instead, this ap-
proach begins with a social welfare function constructed from ethical
principles to guide the selection of an appropriate discount rate and to re-
flect society's views concerning tradeoffs in evaluating public and private
activities.47
Under the prescriptive approach, future benefits involving nonmonetary
assets, such as human lives and the environment, generally enjoy a lower dis-
count rate than financial assets. Neither of the two reasons for discounting
40. Arrow, supra note 37, at 7.
41. Jorgenson et al., supra note 37, at 96. Such position, however, is not without opposition.
For example, Professors Bailey and Jensen argue that the allowance for risk should be greater for
government projects because efficient allocation of risk bearing is usually more difficult for gov-
ernment projects than it is for private ones. See Martin J. Bailey & Michael C. Jensen, Risk and the
Discount Rate for Public Investment, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 269, 269
(Michael C. Jensen ed., 1972).
42. David F. Burgess, Complementarity and the Discount Rate for Public Investment, 103
Q.J. EcON. 527, 530 (1988).
43. ROSEN, supra note 27, at 247-48.
44. Arrow et al., supra note 26, at 135.
45. See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Envirnmental Law and Future Genera-
tions, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289, 298 n.45 (2003).
46. Arrow et al., supra note 26, at 131.
47. Id.
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future cash flows, opportunity cost of capital and pure time preference, 48 is
relevant in a nonmonetary context.49 As Professor Sunstein illustrates, one
cannot extend the opportunity cost of capital argument to justify the dis-
counting of a future human life, because "it cannot plausibly be urged
that... a current life saved can be immediately 'invested.' o Furthermore,
discounting based on pure time preference in an intergenerational context
presents serious moral problems, because "the death of a 35-year-old in
2004 does not seem worth more than the death of a 35-year-old in 2044."5l
For these reasons, Professor Revesz suggests that different discount rates
should apply to two separate types of harms. When considering latent harms
that will occur within an individual's lifetime, a positive discount rate is ap-
propriate, but future benefits derived from the prevention of such latent
harms should be discounted at a lower rate than the private rate of return. 2
On the other hand, when considering harms to future generations, the "use
of discounting ... is ethically unjustified."" If one generation imposes the
externalities of its activities on the next, "[i]t would be difficult to construct
an attractive ethical theory that privilege[s] [a person in an earlier genera-
tion] merely because she lived fifty years earlier."5 Similarly, scholars have
advocated adopting a lower discount rate when evaluating the benefits of
environmental regulations, even though they do not agree on the appropriate
extent of the downward adjustment.5
Despite the disagreement among scholars as to the correct approach for
selecting a discount rate, they concur on one point. Advocates of both the
prescriptive and descriptive approaches agree that there is not a single dis-
count rate that applies universally to all future costs and benefits. The
appropriate choice of discount rate should reflect a variety of factors, in-
cluding risk and social preference. In sum, scholars generally agree that the
discount rate should be adjusted upward when evaluating high-risk cash
flows or private investment and downward when evaluating future consump-
tion, benefits of government projects, and future nonmonetary assets such as
human lives and the natural environment.
48. See supra text accompanying note 9.
49. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 84.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Revesz, supra note 20, at 947 ("[I1t is necessary to discount [latent harms]
.... [However,] such discounting must be accompanied by countervailing upward adjustments
53. Id.
54. Id. at 998.
55. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 15, at 1906 (agreeing with Professor Heinzerling, supra
note 15, that the rate of return in the private sector is too high a discount rate for environmental
regulations but disagreeing with her that environmental regulations should not be discounted at all);
Heinzerling, supra note 15, at 2069.
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II. MODELING NET PRESENT VALUE OVER TIME
This Part proposes a novel approach, the Marginal Net Present Value
("M-NPV") model, to evaluate the implications of discounting competing
activities at different rates. Section II.A introduces a simple model5 6 of two
activities that compete for the same resource and analyzes the utility-
maximizing resource allocation resulting from the use of different dis-
count rates when evaluating the future benefits of these activities. Section
II.B generalizes the model in Section II.A into the M-NPV model, which,
in evaluating the economic efficiency of adopting an activity, asks the
question of "when" instead of "if." Section II.B identifies three possible
utility-maximizing outcomes under the M-NPV model and outlines the
conditions that would lead to each of these outcomes. Section II.C dis-
cusses and rejects the potential criticism that the M-NPV model will lead
to an infinite series of postponements. It argues that the infinite postpone-
ment paradox is a result of an erroneous assumption that the relative prices
of future benefits will remain unchanged over time. This assumption is
fundamentally inconsistent with asymmetric discounting. Section II.C
concludes by proposing an alternative formulation of the asymmetric dis-
counting problem to make separate adjustments for pure time preference
and changes in relative value.
A. A First Model with Asymmetric Discount Rates
For analytical simplicity, let us assume that an activity, once adopted,
will generate a continuous and perpetual stream of constant annual bene-
fits of b,, unadjusted for risk, in an inflation-free economy ("Stream 1").
Given any constant discount rate r, we can compute the present value of
this benefit stream, represented by the shaded region in Figure 1.
56. For a mathematical statement of this model, see infra Appendix.
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FIGURE I
THE MARGINAL PRESENT VALUE OF A SINGLE
BENEFIT STREAM OVER TIME
Marginal Present Value over Time
a
time
Further assume that another activity generates a second stream of bene-
fits ("Stream 2"). In addition to applying to the second benefit stream the
assumptions stated for the first benefit stream, we further assume that the
57appropriate discount rate for the second stream, r2, is always lower than r,.
We label the amount of recurring benefits of this stream as b,
Using the assumptions above, the rest of this Section attempts to answer
the following question: if the two activities are mutually exclusive-that is, to
pursue one we must forego the other-which one should we choose? Because
the two benefit streams are mutually exclusive, one becomes the opportunity
cost of the other, and we must perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine
the utility-maximizing outcome.
To answer this question, we must first determine which stream generates
a higher annual benefit. Because both streams generate a constant annual
benefit, if Stream 2 generates a higher annual benefit and its future benefits
are simultaneously discounted at a lower rate, that is, b2>b, and r2<r,, then
the present value of Stream 2 must be higher than that of Stream 1. Fur-
thermore, Stream 2's marginal present value over time is always higher than
the marginal present value of Stream 1, as shown in Figure 2. There is little
doubt that Stream 2 is the preferred stream in this case.
57. r2<r, if r, and r, are constant over time.
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FIGURE 2
THE MARGINAL PRESENT VALUE OF Two
BENEFIT STREAMS OVER TIME. STREAM 2'S
ANNUAL BENEFIT IS HIGHER THAN THAT OF STREAM I
AND IS DISCOUNTED AT A LOWER RATE THAN STREAM I.
Marginal Present Value over Time
time
But if Stream 1 generates a higher annual benefit than Stream 2, that is,
b2<b, and r2<r,, as shown in Figure 3, the optimal choice becomes less evi-
dent. The marginal present value of Stream 1 is greater than that of Stream 2
only until a certain point in the future, and it is not obvious which stream
has a higher total present value.
The NPV approach to cost-benefit analysis appears to provide a solu-
tion: because the benefits generated by one stream are the opportunity cost
of the other, we can simply compute the present value for each benefit
stream and choose the one with the higher present value, such that the net
present value of that stream, computed as its present value minus the present
value of the opportunity cost, is positive.
2045June 20071
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FIGURE 3
STREAM 2'S ANNUAL BENEFIT IS
LOWER THAN THAT OF STREAM I BUT IS ALSO
DISCOUNTED AT A LOWER RATE THAN IS STREAM I.
time
Given constant annual benefits, if the difference between the two dis-
count rates is large enough, then the present value of Stream 2 will exceed
the present value of Stream 1, and we should choose Stream 2, 5 as shown in
Figure 4. Likewise, if the difference between the two discount rates is not as
large as in the example above, then the present value of Stream 1 will ex-
ceed the present value of Stream 2, and we should choose Stream 1, as
shown in Figure 5.
58. For a mathematical proof, see infra Appendix.
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FIGURES 4 AND 5
CHOOSING ONE STREAM OVER ANOTHER
Choosing Stream 2 over Stream 1
Stream 1
Choosing Stream 1 over Stream 2
Stream 1
time
A closer look at the NPV approach reveals a problem. Because Stream 1
generates a higher annual benefit than Stream 2 but is also discounted at a
higher rate, there is a certain point in the future, t*, where the present value
of the marginal benefit of Stream 1 becomes equal to that of Stream 2 and,
beyond that point, smaller than that of Stream 2. This point is the intersec-
tion of the two curves in Figures 4 and 5. Assume that we have chosen
Stream 1 over Stream 2 because this choice results in a positive net present
value; we then notice that the positive net present value accrued up to t is
partially offset by the negative net present value accrued after that point. In
the extreme case where the net present value of adopting either stream is
zero, the positive net present value accrued before the two curves intersect is
entirely offset by the negative net present value accrued after the intersec-
tion.
2047June 2007]
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A better solution under such circumstances is to adopt the two mutually
exclusive activities in turn: first, Stream 1, up to the point t', followed by
Stream 2. Adopting Stream 1 before t* builds up a positive net present value:
the marginal present value of Stream l's benefits remains greater than that
of Stream 2 before t*. Following Stream 1 beyond t*, however, will result in
this positive net present value being gradually eroded by the negative
buildup of Stream l's net present value, as shown above in Figure 5. After t,
the marginal present value of Stream l's benefits is less than that of Stream
2, its opportunity cost. We therefore switch to Stream 2 at that point and
continue the buildup of net present value, as shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
THE OPTIMAL COURSE OF ACTION: ADOPT STREAM I
UNTIL t*, FOLLOWED BY STREAM 2
Time-Dividing between Two Streams
Stream 1
t*
Stream 2 -.
AdoptStream 1 Ado t Stream 2
time
Thus, if the annual benefits of Stream 1 are higher than those of Stream
2, and if Stream l's benefits are discounted at a higher rate, the utility-
maximizing course of action is to adopt Stream 1 until the time at which the
marginal net present value of each stream is equal and to switch to Stream 2
thereafter.
B. Ask "When," Not "If': A Marginal Net Present Value Approach
The simple model presented in Part A reveals an internal inconsistency
inherent to the NPV approach of cost-benefit analysis as it is currently
practiced. On one hand, the NPV approach looks into the future and
discounts future costs and benefits over the time horizon. On the other hand,
it disregards the time dimension completely when comparing the discounted
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values and considers only the question of "if," not "when." This dichotomy
can lead to a variety of inefficient decisions. For example, an activity with a
negative net present value, if adopted today, will not pass the NPV test
under a cost-benefit analysis, but it can nevertheless produce a positive net
present value if we defer it for a certain period of time instead of dismissing
it altogether. Likewise, an activity with a positive net present value today
may yield an even higher net present value if we defer it to the future.
Adopting it today simply because it passes the NPV test foregoes the option
of adopting it in the future and ultimately fails to maximize the net present
value.
To remedy this deficiency in the traditional NPV test, this Note proposes
the Marginal Net Present Value model, which asks the broader question of
"when" instead of "if." The M-NPV model seeks to maximize the net pre-
sent value by selecting the optimal point in time, t', to adopt the activity
instead of determining whether the proposed activity will generate a positive
net present value. This optimal time t may be zero, indicating that the time
to adopt is now; some positive number, indicating that the activity should be
deferred for a certain period of time; or infinity, indicating that the proposed
activity should not be adopted.
As its name would suggest, the M-NPV model examines the marginal
net present value as it changes over time rather than the aggregate net pre-
sent value. Marginal analysis is a fundamental technique in the study of
economics. 9 In the context of supply-demand analysis, economic efficiency
occurs when "the marginal benefit associated with producing one more unit
of any good equal[s] its marginal cost. ' That situation produces efficiency
because "if the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, society would
gain from producing more of the good; and if the marginal benefit was less
than the marginal cost, society would gain from reducing production of the
good.' '6' This logic applies equally to marginal net present value analysis.
Due to asymmetric discounting, the present value of the marginal cost
("PVMC") necessarily decreases at a faster rate than does the present value
of the marginal benefit ("PVMB"). Thus, if the PVMC of an activity ex-
ceeds its PVMB at a certain point, the marginal net present value at that
point is negative, and society can avoid accruing this negative value by de-
ferring the activity to a later date. Likewise, if the PVMB of the activity
exceeds its PVMC at some future point, society can capture the excess of
PVMB over PVMC by adopting the activity at an earlier point. The optimal
point at which to adopt the activity, therefore, is when PVMB equals
PVMC, that is, when the marginal net present value is zero.
59. Introductory macroeconomics and microeconomics textbooks typically present marginal
analysis in the first chapter as a basic concept in the study of economics. See, e.g., DAVID A. BESANKO
& RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 9-11 (2d ed. 2005) (introducing "marginal reason-
ing" as first of the three key analytical tools in microeconomics); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL &
STANLEY L. BRUE, MACROECONOMICS 4 (16th ed. 2004) ("The economic perspective focuses
largely on marginal analysis--comparisons of marginal benefits and marginal costs.").
60. STIGLITZ, supra note 37, at 62.
61. Id.
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A concrete example helps illustrate this point. Assume, given the model
introduced in the previous Section, that Stream 1 represents the benefits de-
rived from maintaining the status quo and Stream 2 represents the benefits
derived from adopting a certain proposed activity. Further assume that the
present value of future benefits from each stream are equal, so that either
maintaining the status quo forever or adopting the proposed activity imme-
diately will produce a net present value of zero. Under the traditional NPV
approach, the regulator is indifferent between the two.
M-NPV analysis examines the relationship between the marginal net
present value of the proposed activity and the time of adoption, as shown in
Figure 7-1. Using M-NPV analysis, a decision maker can observe that there
is a certain point in the future, t*, where the present value of the marginal
benefit of Stream 2 will be equal to the present value of the marginal cost, as
shown in Figure 7-1. Before this point, the present value of the marginal
benefit of maintaining the status quo is greater than the present value of the
marginal cost. After this point, the situation is reversed: the marginal net
present value of adopting Stream 2 becomes positive. Under M-NPV analy-
sis, adopting Stream 2 at this point will maximize the net present value of
the activity, as shown in Figure 7-2. The decision maker should therefore
choose to maintain the status quo until t*, at which point she should adopt
the activity whose benefits are represented by Stream 2. NPV analysis, in
contrast, only examines the two extreme ends of this curve and is indifferent
between adopting Stream 2 now and maintaining the status quo, because
both would produce a net present value of zero.
FIGURE 7-I
MARGINAL NET PRESENT VALUE OF STREAM 2 OVER TIME
M-NPV of Stream 2 over Time
*
C
Time
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FIGURE 7-2
TOTAL NET PRESENT VALUE AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
FOR STREAM 2'S ADOPTION
Choosing the Optimal Time
t*
Time to Switch from Stream 1 to Stream 2
More generally, assuming that Stream 2 is discounted at a lower rate
than Stream 1, such that r2<r,, a cost-benefit analysis applying the M-NPV
model will produce one of the following three possible scenarios, depending
on whether Stream 2's recurring benefit, b2, is greater than the recurring
benefit of Stream 1, b, and on which stream has a larger benefit-to-discount
ratio, or b/r.
Scenario 1. Immediate adoption of Stream 2 generates a positive net
present value, and the net present value decreases as we postpone adoption,
as shown in Figure 8-1. This occurs when the recurring benefit of Stream 2
is higher than that of Stream 1, such that b2>b,.
62. For a mathematical proof of this claim, see infra Appendix.
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FIGURE 8-I
M-NPV SCENARIO I: IMMEDIATE ADOPTION
Choosing the Optimal Time
Optimal time
Time to Switch from Stream 1 to Stream 2
Under the traditional NPV analysis, we should immediately adopt the
activity because the net present value for immediate adoption is positive. M-
NPV analysis reaches the same result, because immediate adoption yields
the highest net present value.
Scenario 2. Immediate adoption of Stream 2 generates a positive net
present value, but the net present value increases as we postpone adoption
until it reaches a maximum, as shown in Figure 8-2. This occurs when the
recurring benefit of Stream 2 is lower than that of Stream 1, such that b2<b,,
and the ratio between b2 and r2 is greater than the ratio between b, and r,
such that b2/ r2 > b, / r,).
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FIGURE 8-2
M-NPV SCENARIO 2: POSITIVE NPV, DEFERRED ADOPTION
Choosing the Optimal Time
Optimal Time
00
z
Time to Switch from Stream 1 to Stream 2
The proposed activity passes the traditional NPV test and, therefore, will
be adopted immediately. The M-NPV model, however, identifies a future
date of adoption that would further increase the net present value. Accord-
ingly, the activity will still be adopted under the M-NPV model but will be
deferred until a future date.
Scenario 3. Immediate adoption of Stream 2 generates a negative net
present value, but thereafter the net present value increases, reaching a posi-
tive maximum point before declining again, as shown in Figure 8-3. This
occurs when the recurring benefit of Stream 2 is lower than that of Stream 1,
such that b2<bl, and the ratio between b2 and r2 is less than the ratio between
b, and r, (b2/ r2 < b,/ r1).
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FIGURE 8-3
M-NPV SCENARIO 3: NEGATIVE NPV, DEFERRED ADOPTION
Choosing the Optimal Time
Otlal Time
Z
Time to Switch from Stream 1 to Stream 2
Instead of treating the proposed activity as worthless because immediate
adoption produces a negative net present value, M-NPV analysis suggests
that the activity should be adopted at a certain time in the future, at which
point the present value is both positive and maximized.6 3
C. Achilles and the Tortoise: The Paradox of Infinite Postponement
The simple intuition that one should postpone an activity until the time
when it becomes more valuable than its alternative is hardly new. One rea-
son that this intuition, as it relates to the theory and practice of asymmetric
discounting, has not received the attention it deserves may lie in the fact that
some scholars who previously discussed this intuition went on to conclude
that the first postponement would set off a chain reaction, leading inevitably
to an infinite series of postponements. 6 They criticized the theory of asym-
metric discounting based on the "absurd consequences that would
inexorably follow if discounting was not performed [on both sides of the
cost-benefit analysis]., 65 Their reasoning, as summarized by Professor
Revesz in the environmental law context, is that:
[I]nstead of undertaking the environmental program, one could invest the
funds in an alternative project, watch the investment grow, and then ad-
dress the environmental problem at some time in the future. At this future
63. For a formal proof of this claim, see infra Appendix.
64. See Revesz, supra note 20, at 988-90 (summarizing the arguments of scholars who be-
lieve that an initial postponement will recursively lead to an infinite number of future
postponements).
65. Id. at 988.
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time, moreover, one would engage in the same calculus and decide to
66postpone the environmental expenditure once more.
Professor Revesz further observed that this argument turns the view that
asymmetric discounting makes environmental programs more desirable "on
its head" because asymmetric discounting would be environmentally unde-
sirable if environmental programs must be postponed forever as a result.
6 7
Stripped of its environmental context, the argument that asymmetric dis-
counting will delay a project forever may also cast some doubt over the M-
NPV model presented above. Given the simple model introduced in Section
II.A, one might suggest that, instead of switching from Stream 1 to Stream 2
at time t*, the decision maker should reapply the model at time t* and decide
to further delay the adoption of Stream 2 until time 2t*. At first glance, this
argument seems logical. Assume that Streams 1 and 2 are constant and per-
petually recurring benefit streams, that they yield annual benefits of $12
million and one human life saved, respectively, and that Stream 2 is dis-
counted at a lower rate than Stream 1. Further assume that the value of a
statistical human life is $6 million.68 Suppose we decide in Year 1 that the
utility-maximizing course of action is to adopt Stream 1 immediately and to
switch to Stream 2 in Year 20. In Year 20, however, we are faced with the
exact same utility-maximizing problem as in Year 1. The benefit streams are
still assumed to be constant. Stream 1 will still produce $12 million each
year and continue to appear more desirable than Stream 2. Stream 2 will still
save one life per year and should still be postponed for another 20 years,
now until Year 40. By repeating this process an infinite number of times, the
decision maker will never adopt Stream 2. This exercise of reductio ad ab-
surdum resembles "Achilles and the Tortoise," one of the well-known Zeno's
paradoxes. 69 Each attempts to prove the nonoccurrence of an event by argu-
ing that it will not happen within a limited time and applying this argument
recursively for all future time frames. The fallacy in "Achilles and the Tor-
toise" has long been recognized and explained. 70 The fallacy in its modem
incarnation will be explored in the remainder of this Section.
Working within the environmental context, Professor Revesz gave two
explanations why environmental projects need not be postponed indefinitely
under asymmetric discounting.7' First, he observed that the costs and bene-
fits of environmental programs in the real world will change over time and
that "one cannot merely perform a static calculation of the magnitude of
66. Id. at 989.
67. Id.
68. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
69. Zeno's "Achilles and the Tortoise" paradox states that "the slowest thing will never be
caught up by the quickest; for the pursuer has first to arrive at the point from which the pursued has
started, so that the slower is always ahead." ARISTOTLE'S PHYsics 416 (W.D. Ross ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1936).
70. "The claim that that which is ahead is not caught up is false; it is not caught up when it is
ahead, but it is caught up, if one allows that a finite line can be traversed to the end." Id.
71. Revesz, supra note 20, at 990-92.
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costs and damages on a particular date."" Instead, certain environmental
projects must be adopted immediately to avoid irreversible damage to the
environment or even catastrophic consequences." Second, "difficulties con-
cerning the transfer of resources across projects" favor adopting certain
projects immediately rather than switching to them only after exhausting
other higher-yield projects first.14
Professor Revesz's argument, while powerful, does not explain how the
M-NPV model avoids the infinite postponement paradox. By arguing that
many environmental projects should be adopted now rather than later, Pro-
fessor Revesz stops the chain-of-postponement reasoning before its first
iteration. The M-NPV model, in contrast, suggests that immediate adoption
is desirable only under Scenario 1. For the other two scenarios, the M-NPV
model suggests that there should be an initial postponement. A justification
for the M-NPV model must explain how the seemingly infinite chain will be
broken after its first link.
Nor do Professor Revesz's arguments imply that the M-NPV model
reaches the wrong result in concluding that there should be an initial post-
ponement in Scenarios 2 and 3. Professor Revesz argues that the costs and
benefits of "many environmental problems" may change over time,75 thereby
negating one of the basic assumptions made by the M-NPV model. As an
initial inquiry into the theory of asymmetric discounting, the M-NPV model
assumes constant benefit streams in order to better understand these most
basic cost-benefit structures. This assumption is both reasonable and neces-
sary given that many environmental programs have a relatively stable cost
and benefit structure in the long term. Second, the cost-to-transfer argu-
ment76 implicitly assumes that postponing an activity until a later time will
necessitate a transfer in the future, while immediate adoption does not re-
quire a transfer of resources at the present. This assumption may not hold
for the type of problems the M-NPV model attempts to address. For exam-
ple, if resources are initially located in the manufacturing industry and a
policymaker is considering whether to adopt a regulation to shift these re-
sources elsewhere, perhaps as an environmental investment, she will face
the same cost-to-transfer issue regardless of whether she initiates the trans-
fer now or later.
The fallacy of the infinite postponement paradox lies in a misunder-
standing of the nature of asymmetric discounting. By adopting a lower
discount rate for a certain type of benefits, a decision maker is essentially
72. Id. at 990.
73. Id. at 990-91.
74. Id. at 991-92.
75. Id. at 990. It appears that Professor Revesz limited the scope of his argument by stating
that "[t]his assumption, [that costs and benefits will remain unchanged over time], is inconsistent
with the structure of many environmental problems." Id. (emphasis added). It remains unclear why
this assumption may not be applicable to other environmental problems that do have relatively sta-
ble costs and benefits in the long term.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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expressing her prediction, either descriptively or prescriptively, that these
benefits will rise in value over time relative to other types of benefits; dis-
counting them at the normal discount rate will not reflect this change in
relative value and will improperly undervalue these benefits in the future.77
It is therefore illogical to assume that the decision maker in Year t* will use
the relative value of Stream 2 benefits from Year 1 and make the same deci-
sion to postpone the adoption once again. This gradual change in the relative
value of the benefits produced by the two streams does not contradict our
basic assumption that these benefit streams remain constant over time. Each
of the two streams will produce an annual benefit that remains unchanged
when compared to its own historical values, yet the relative value of each
stream will change by the very nature of asymmetric discounting.
To help illustrate this point, consider once again the example from above
where Stream 1 produces $12 million per year and Stream 2 saves one life
per year, with the value of a statistical life currently set at $6 million..7 The
reason we use a lower discount rate for the value of human lives is because a
regular discount rate will grossly underestimate the value of a human life in
the future, in either the descriptive sense or the prescriptive sense. In other
words, the current rate of $6 million per statistical life is too low for future
purposes. Therefore, asymmetric discounting necessarily predicts that the
value of a human life, relative to financial assets, will gradually increase
over time until it rises to $12 million in Year 20. After that point, although
the benefits produced by Stream 1 and Stream 2 remain unchanged at $12
million and one human life, respectively, one human life will be worth more
than $12 million, and we should switch to Stream 2. The infinite postpone-
ment argument fails when it ignores the prediction implied by the very
nature of asymmetric discounting and mistakenly assumes that the relative
values set in Year 1 will still apply in Year 20.
The discussion above reveals a functional equivalent of asymmetric dis-
counting: we may apply a uniform discount rate, r, to all benefits but
gradually raise the price tag of certain resources at some annual rate, g, to
account for our prediction that these benefits will be undervalued relative to
others if discounted at the regular rate. The result is the same: the annual
growth rate in relative value, g, partially offsets the effect of the uniform
discount rate r. The effective discount rate for these resources would then
become r-g, which is lower than the regular rate r applicable to other re-
sources and potentially zero if g equals r. This formulation better captures
the underlying rationale of asymmetric discounting by embodying our pre-
diction that certain resources will become more valuable in the future
relative to others. Like the certainty-equivalent method, which makes sepa-
rate adjustments for risk and time when discounting risky future cash
flows, 79 this formulation also decouples discounting for pure time preference
77. See supra Part IA-B.
7. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 36.
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from adjusting for changes in relative value. With this alternative expression
of the idea of asymmetric discounting, the infinite postponement paradox
becomes even less perplexing. No longer will the increase in relative value
have to be deduced from an exercise of logical reasoning-it is explicitly
stated in the formulation of the problem.
III. THE M-NPV MODEL AND NUISANCE REMEDIES: A CASE STUDY
This Part applies the M-NPV model to nuisance cases arising out of in-
compatible land uses and concludes that a suspended injunction is the
utility-maximizing resolution of such disputes. Section LI.A briefly reviews
existing literature on entitlement assignment and rules of protection in these
nuisance cases. Section III.B examines one such case, Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co. ,8o in which the court considered whether to award the plaintiffs
a temporary injunction followed by permanent damages or vice versa. Sec-
tion III.C applies the M-NPV model and argues that, in a case such as
Boomer, the entitlement first should be awarded to the polluter for a number
of years and then should be permanently awarded to the victims of pollu-
tion. Section III.D further argues that victims should be protected first by a
liability rule and then, once the entitlement shifts, by a property rule.
A. The Cathedral Revisited: Entitlement and Rules of Protection
In a nuisance case between a polluter and neighboring residents, most
courts use a two-step analysis. First, the court decides who has the entitle-
ment: that is, whether the polluter is entitled to pollute or the residents are
entitled to a pollution-free neighborhood. Then, the court makes a series of
"difficult second order decisions"'81 in which the court decides whether to
protect the entitlement established in the previous step with a property rule
or a liability rule.s2 There are four possible outcomes in such a pollution
case, as categorized by Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed and summa-
rized by Professors Krier and Schwab. A court can (1) protect the residents
with a property rule by issuing an injunction against the polluter, (2) protect
the residents with a liability rule by finding a nuisance but limiting the rem-
edy to damages, (3) protect the polluter with a property rule by finding that
the pollution is not a nuisance and permitting the polluter to continue, or
80. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
81. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
82. Id. A property rule applies when "someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from
its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction." Id. An entitlement is protected by a
liability rule when "someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it." Id.
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(4) protect the polluter with a liability rule by ordering the neighbors to pay
the polluter "damages" for discontinuing the polluting activity.83
The initial assignment of entitlement depends on the parties' valuation
of the entitlement and the identification of the "cheapest cost avoider." If
the residents value their right to a pollution-free neighborhood more than the
polluter values the right to pollute, then the residents should have the enti-
tlement, and vice versa. From society's point of view, this is the "cost-
minimizing or value-maximizing"85 allocation.
Once the court initially allocates the entitlement, the choice between
property rules (rules 1 and 3) and liability rules (rules 2 and 4) largely turns
on the level of transaction costs anticipated in transferring an entitlement
protected by a property rule. If transaction costs are insignificant, then the
court should use a property rule to resolve the dispute. That is, even if the
court makes an economically inefficient decision by awarding the
entitlement to the party that values it the least, because subsequent voluntary
negotiation can transfer the entitlement to the party that values it the most,
an efficient outcome will result regardless of the initial allocation of the
entitlement.86 On the other hand, if the transaction costs are high-either due
87to the hold-out and free-rider problems in multi-party negotiations or
because of the strategic behavior induced by bilateral monopoly in a two-
party suitSS-the court should instead use a liability rule to ensure an
efficient outcome. s9 The drawback of a liability rule, when compared to a
property rule, is that the court must determine the efficient outcome. Due to
the practical difficulties in gauging an individual's true valuation of an asset,
this determination may involve significant assessment costs and "may result
in over or under compensation."9
83. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral
in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 443-44 (1995). See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
81, at 1119-20.
84. Krier & Schwab, supra note 83, at 448.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 450-51.
87. The hold-out problem refers to the phenomenon where one party to a transaction negoti-
ates a purchase from multiple parties on the other side in order to complete the transaction so that
each party on the other side has a de facto veto power and will attempt to extract an exorbitant price.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 61 (6th ed. 2003). The free-rider problem
occurs when multiple parties negotiate a purchase and each party has the incentive to contribute less
than his fair share of the purchase price. See id.
88. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment: A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 378 (1999). Bilateral monopoly refers to the high
transaction costs that arise when "neither party has good alternatives to dealing with the other" in a
two-party transaction. POSNER, supra note 87, at 60. The transaction costs may be high because if
"there is a range of prices within which each party will prefer settlement to the more costly alterna-
tive of litigation," then "each party may be so determined to engross the greater part of the potential
profits from the transaction that they never succeed in coming to terms." Id. at 60-61.
89. Krier & Schwab, supra note 83, at 450-51.
90. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 81, at 1108.
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B. Time-Dividing Rules and Entitlement: The Boomer Case
The choice between liability and property rules does not have to follow
an all-or-nothing scheme. At least one court has considered the possibility of
time dividing the protection of an entitlement between liability and property
rules. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,9' a group of landowners sought an
injunction against a nearby cement plant for emitting dust and conducting
excessive blasting. Noting that "[tihe total damage to plaintiffs' properties
is ... relatively small in comparison with the value of defendant's operation
and with the consequences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek, 92 the
court granted an injunction against the cement plant, to be lifted if and when
it paid permanent damages to the residents.93 This "disparity in economic
consequences," 94 a classic cause of bilateral monopoly and other strategic
behavior that leads to high transaction costs, calls for a direct application of
rule 2 as identified by Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed-protecting the
residents with a liability rule by limiting their remedy to damages only.95
Indeed, the trial court's decision to deny the injunction appears to have been
based primarily on this ground.96 Feeling constrained by the well-established
doctrine that "where a nuisance has been found and where there has been
any substantial damage shown by the party complaining an injunction will
be granted,' 97 the Court of Appeals adopted a solution that was arguably a
time-divided combination of property and liability rules. The court's holding
initially protected the residents with a property rule by granting the injunc-
tion and subsequently protected the residents with a liability rule by
allowing the polluter to pay permanent damages in order to remove the in-
junction.98
In addition to the time division between liability and property rules, the
Boomer court also considered the possibility of time dividing the entitle-
ment. The alternative contemplated by the court was "to grant the injunction
but postpone its effect to a specified future date to give opportunity for tech-
nical advances to permit defendant to eliminate the nuisance,"99 effectively
91. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
92. Id. at 872.
93. Id. at 875.
94. Id. at 872.
95. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
96. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872. This economic disparity in favor of the cement plant, how-
ever, also seems to imply that rule 3 as identified by Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed, a
property rule, may be appropriate, at least from a pure economic-efficiency point of view, because if
the court can ascertain that the cement plant values the entitlement more and that the residents are
the cheapest cost avoiders, it can deny any remedies and permit the cement plant to continue to
operate. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
97. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872.
98. Id. at 875 ("[T]he cases [should be] remitted to Supreme Court, Albany County to grant
an injunction which shall be vacated upon payment by defendant of such amounts of permanent
damage to the respective plaintiffs... .
99. Id. at 873.
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granting the entitlement first to the polluter until a future date after which
the entitlement would shift to the residents. This approach appears attractive
because it nominally adheres to the rule that the court should enjoin a nui-
sance "whenever the damage resulting from [the] nuisance is found not
'unsubstantial' " 0 and implicitly appeals to the intuition that the entitlement
should be given to the party who values it more.'0' The court, however, dis-
missed this alternative as impracticable because "there would be no
assurance that any significant technical improvement would occur" within
any specified time period.' °2
C. M-NPV Step 1: Who Gets the Entitlement, and at What Time?
In this Section and the next, this Note applies the M-NPV model to the
Boomer case and attempts to derive the utility-maximizing remedy. As will
be clear from the analysis below, the remedy awarded by the Boomer court
is the less efficient of the two alternatives it considered. A better remedy
would have been to award temporary damages to the plaintiffs followed by a
permanent injunction.
From an economic efficiency point of view, proper assignment of an en-
titlement depends on the parties' valuation of that entitlement. In turn,
inquiring how much a party values an entitlement necessarily entails the
question of what future benefits the entitlement will bring to that party and
how to discount them. As with any other financial asset, the value of the
entitlement to the cement plant in Boomer is determined by discounting to
present value and summing up all future benefits, in this case the annual
profits anticipated from its operation because without this entitlement the
plant would be required to "close down ... at once."' 3 Therefore, the value
of the permanent entitlement to produce pollution is equal to the present
value of the future stream of the cement plant's profits. The trial court did
not make any express determination as to the exact amount of such profits
but noted that the defendant invested more than $40 million in the plant, °4 a
fact mentioned again in the Court of Appeals opinion.' This figure is very
likely intended to suggest the magnitude of the cement plant's annual profits
when compared to the plaintiffs' damages. Even at a modest 7% to 8% an-
nual rate of return, the plant likely had an annual profit of $3 million.
Likewise, the value of the entitlement to the residents is also determined
by discounting to present value all future benefits derived from a pollution-
free home. The Boomer court suggested that the value of this entitlement is
100. Id. at 872.
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873.
103. Id.
104. Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 287 N.YS.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). Unless other-
wise indicated, the term "Boomer court" refers to the New York Court of Appeals and the appellate
opinion.
105. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 n.*.
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equal to the "permanent depreciation of [the] value of affected property"'' 6
without the entitlement. At first glance, this suggestion does not involve any
discounting because the depreciation in property value is simply the differ-
ence between the present price of the affected property and the present price
of the same property if there were no nuisance. Upon closer look, however,
the price of real property, like any other asset, is determined by discounting
and aggregating all future benefits derived from the property. Depreciation
in property value is in essence determined by discounting all future nui-
sance-induced loss of benefits, such as discomfort, loss of enjoyment, or
loss of rental income, to present value. The Boomer court apparently agreed,
as it described "permanent damages" as "'present, past and future'" dam-
ages. '°7 Therefore, the value of the entitlement to the residents is the present
value of the stream of annual benefits, which is the difference between the
amount of enjoyment residents derive from a pollution-free home and a
home affected by the nuisance. The trial court in Boomer found this value to
be $185,000, '08 less than one-tenth of the likely annual value of the entitle-
ment to the cement plant.
Under a traditional NPV model, the entitlement analysis ends here. The
polluter values the right to pollute much more than the residents value the
right to enjoin pollution; accordingly, the polluter receives the entitlement
because the residents are the cheapest cost avoiders. In contrast, the M-NPV
model asks one further question in analyzing the valuation of the entitle-
ment: what discount rates are used in calculating the present values of the
entitlement? As demonstrated in Part II, if one discount rate is higher than
the other, and if the annual benefit of the corresponding benefit stream is
higher than that of the other benefit stream, the M-NPV model produces a
different outcome than the NPV model.
Under the descriptive approach, the discount rate applicable to the ce-
ment plant should be higher than that applicable to the residents. First, the
cement plant faces a higher degree of risk than the residents. The inherent
volatility of the cement market as well as the speculative nature of the an-
ticipated future profits both add to the risk premium component of the
discount rate appropriate to the cement plant's future profits. The cement
industry as a whole may become unprofitable for any number of reasons
ranging from rising energy costs to competition from abroad, or this particu-
lar plant may fail to earn a profit in the future due to poor management. The
residents, on the other hand, face a much lower risk. They most likely will
have a positive gain from a nuisance-free home over a polluted home as
long as the real property exists. Second, the polluter's entitlement itself is
106. Id. at 874.
107. Id. (citing N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vesey, 200 N.E. 620, 634 (Ind. 1936)).
108. Id. at 873. This is likely too low an estimate. On remand, the defendant settled with all
but one of the plaintiffs, and in the remaining case the trial court awarded $175,000 in damages. In
the end, the defendant's liability, including the settlements, totaled $710,000. JESSE DuKEMNIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 764 (5th ed. 2002) (citing Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Jus-
tice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (Peter Hay &
Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988)).
2062 [Vol. 105:2035
Now, Later, or Never
more exposed to the risk of reduced future value than the resident's entitle-
ment. Public sentiment against pollution and federal environmental
regulations both operate as strong incentives for the development of new
technologies to reduce pollution. As a result, there is a higher risk to the
value of the polluter's entitlement to pollute. As pollution-control technol-
ogy advances and provides cleaner production techniques, the right to
pollute will become less valuable to the cement company. Third, under the
"market distortion" theory,' °9 individual residents typically discount future
values at the consumer rate of time preference, which is lower than that of
the private firms due to the "wedge" driven between them by the corporate
income tax.
Under the prescriptive approach, residents also should have a lower dis-
count rate than the cement plant. The depreciation in the residents' property
value is merely a monetary expression of future nonmonetary damages such
as the discomfort caused by dust and noise and the loss of enjoyment of a
clean environment. Allowing the cement plant to pollute permanently will
affect not only the current generation but generations to come. The discount
rate for such nonmonetary damages should reflect the social preference for
clean air as well as our moral and ethical obligations to future generations
and, accordingly, be lower than the discount rate for financial assets.
Having determined that the cement plant values the entitlement more
than the residents and that it also faces a higher discount rate, we observe
that the Boomer case fits squarely with Scenario 3, as discussed in Part II. In
this scenario, the net present value of adopting one activity is negative if it is
adopted immediately but increases over time until reaching a positive
maximum. Here, Stream 1 represents the cement plant's anticipated future
stream of profits from continued operation and emission of pollution while
Stream 2 represents the residents' anticipated additional enjoyment from a
pollution-free home relative to a home plagued by dust, noise, and vibra-
tions emitted by the cement plant. Stream 1 begins with a higher present
value but is also discounted at a higher rate. Both streams have the potential
of generating a perpetual income stream.
M-NPV analysis of the Boomer case indicates that the court should time
divide the entitlement between the parties. Under Scenario 3, the best course
of action to maximize social utility is to adopt Stream 1 for a limited period
of time and then to adopt Stream 2 permanently. Here, the court should first
give the entitlement to the cement plant for a limited period of time and then
give the entitlement permanently to the residents. This result is essentially
the same as the alternative solution considered by the Boomer court but
dismissed as impracticable. This result allows lead time and provides an
incentive for the cement plant to actively seek or develop technologies to
abate pollution. It is also consistent with the intuition that an entitlement
should be assigned to whoever values it more-first to the cement plant
when it values the entitlement more and then to the residents when the situa-
tion is reversed in the future.
109. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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A practical complication that may arise in implementing this solution is
the question of how to determine the optimal time to reassign the entitle-
ment to the residents. To calculate the time of reassignment accurately
requires knowing the anticipated annual benefit of the cement plant, the
value of the additional annual enjoyment the residents derive from a pollu-
tion-free home, and the annual discount rates applicable to each benefit
stream. The discount rates themselves are difficult to ascertain empirically
or theoretically, and, further complicating the matter, both benefit streams
may realistically fluctuate from year to year. Additionally, both discount
rates will depend on a variety of external factors such as the national econ-
omy, the volatility in each respective market, and future government
intervention.
The application of the M-NPV model does not have to be a precise sci-
ence to be an improvement over the NPV model. Even with limited
information, a court can still make a reasonable effort at identifying the op-
timal time of reassignment. In Boomer, the traditional result of the
entitlement analysis is to assign the entitlement permanently to the polluter.
In other words, the time of reassignment is infinity, represented by the far-
right end of the curve in Figure 8-3. Starting from infinity and moving left
along the curve, the net present value increases as we assign the entitlement
to the residents at earlier times until we reach the optimal time of reassign-
ment after which the value declines. In this large interval between infinity
and the optimal point, the court has great flexibility and can err on the safe
side by using a high estimate of the optimal point of reassignment. Regard-
less of how high an estimate, the result will improve upon the traditional
NPV approach so long as the estimate falls within the interval between the
optimal point and infinity. While the eighteen months suggested by the dis-
sent in Boomer"O may fall short of the optimal point and thus seem
inadequate, a significantly longer time, say, fifty to a hundred years, could
be a rather conservative estimate."' An inaccurate estimate of the optimal
point is preferable to permanently assigning the entitlement to the polluter.
Furthermore, by allowing the judge to choose any date within this large in-
terval, M-NPV analysis also enables the judge to consider equitable
principles and policy issues that are impossible or difficult to consider under
110. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 877 ("I would enjoin the defendant cement company from con-
tinuing the discharge of dust particles upon its neighbors' properties unless, within 18 months, the
cement company abated this nuisance.") (Jasen, J., dissenting).
111. These numbers are within the range of reasonableness given the facts of Boomer. For
sake of simplicity, assume that the assets of the cement plant are worth $40 million and that the
plant has an annual profit rate of 10% ($4 million annually) and a discount rate of 10%. Further
assume that the residents' total damage, expressed in lump sum, is a one-time payment of $1 mil-
lion, including court-awarded damages and settlements. If the residents face a discount rate of 5%
for the lost enjoyment of their residences due to pollution, a lump sum award of $1 million is
equivalent to a perpetual income stream of $50,000 per year. The present value of the residents'
$50,000 annual income, discounted at 5%, will begin to surpass that of the plant's $4 million annual
profits, discounted at 10%, after 83 years. If the residents' discount rate is 3% instead, the time for
the present value of their benefits to overtake those of the cement plant is reduced to 67 years.
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the rigid rule of permanent assignment of entitlement that apparently con-
strained the Boomer court."2
D. M-NPV Step 2: Protecting the Time-Divided Entitlements
Once the court has determined the initial location of the entitlement and
t*, the optimal time to reassign the entitlement to the other party, it must then
decide whether to protect the entitlement with a property rule or a liability
rule.
113
Between the time of implementation and t*, a court confronted with a
case like Boomer should use a liability rule. Because the cement plant val-
ues the entitlement more than the residents during this time period, and the
potentially high transaction costs between the parties may prevent them
from bargaining, a court subscribing to the "virtual doctrine" that "[w]hen
transaction costs are low, use property rules; when transaction costs are high,
use liability rules,"" 4 will order the cement plant to pay damages to the resi-
dents and allow it to continue to produce pollution until t*. As Professors Krier
and Schwab note, however, scholars have questioned the wisdom of this "vir-
tual doctrine" given the assessment-cost problem."5 The cost to "obtain[] and
process[] information"" 6 in damage calculations may be significant enough
that the entitlement may be misplaced due to a miscalculation that is "suffi-
ciently off the mark.""' 7 In a case like Boomer, however, we can be certain
that the initial assignment of the entitlement is correct because "the large
disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction" ''
makes it highly unlikely that any reasonable error in the calculation of dam-
ages would have led to a different allocation of the entitlement. Therefore,
given the high transaction costs and low assessment costs, the court should
prefer a liability rule. 9
It is less clear which rule the court should favor to protect the residents for
the time period after t'. Neither of the two characteristics that call for a liabil-
ity rule-low assessment costs and high transaction costs-is likely to exist in
the future with much certainty. Assessment costs increase as we attempt to
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. Krier & Schwab, supra note 83, at 450.
114. Id. at 451.
115. Id. at 453.
116. Id.
117. Id. Professors Krier and Schwab summarize the assessment-cost criticism with the fol-
lowing example: Suppose that the polluter's avoidance cost is $100,000 and that residents are
damaged by $120,000. Due to imperfect information, however, the judge estimated the damages to
be only $90,000. Assuming high transaction costs, the judge will allow the pollution to continue,
based on this misestimation of the residents' damages. This is not the efficient outcome. Id. at 453
n.46.
118. Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
119. Krier & Schwab, supra note 83, at 455 ("If... transaction costs suggest that bargaining
will probably break down, liability rules should be preferred ... as a matter of course only in those
instances where assessment costs are relatively manageable.").
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calculate damages further into the future and discount them to their present
values. Judges, like other people, make better predictions about the near
future than the distant future. In estimating the value of the cement plant's
entitlement, the Boomer court avoided the use of any profit projections of
the cement plant, perhaps due to concerns that profit projections become
more speculative and inaccurate as they extend further into the future. 20
Therefore, although it is apparent that, in the short term, the cement plant
values the entitlement much more than the residents value the injunction, it
is not clear how long this will continue to hold. To further complicate the
matter, any small discrepancy in selecting the appropriate discount rate, it-
self a difficult task, will be amplified in the calculation of damages' and
will in turn lead to the choice of a less-than-optimal time to reassign the
entitlement. In the entitlement step, this error in choosing the time of reas-
signment is not too much of a concern because it is relatively easy to
produce a time division that will leave the parties and society better off than
in a traditional all-or-nothing scheme. In the rule-selection step, however,
the difficulty in choosing the appropriate discount rate increases the assess-
ment costs as we look further into the future.
Transaction costs may decrease over time. While negotiating and reach-
ing an agreement with each of the numerous opposing parties may be
unduly difficult and costly for the cement plant within a short period, it may
become possible if the cement plant is given ample time after the judgment.
Furthermore, opportunistic behaviors early on, such as the free-rider prob-
lem, potential holdouts, and bilateral monopolies, may gradually give way
to cooperative bargaining as parties realize that neither side is likely to gain
and that it is in their individual best interest to cooperate. '1 3 In an all-or-
nothing scheme, this realization may come too late, as valuable resources
may be initially locked in by a party who values them less. In a time-
division scheme, the parties are given more lead time to conduct postjudg-
ment negotiation while the entitlement is given to the party who values it
more in the short run. Therefore, due to the potentially higher assessment
costs and lower transaction costs, the court could use a property rule to pro-
tect the residents after t* and defer the assessment of damages to a future
point, conceivably after any postjudgment negotiations.
120. Courts have long been skeptical of any claim of lost profits based on projections or
speculations. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971)
("[I]t is hornbook law, in antitrust actions as in others, that... future damages that might arise from
the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their accrual is speculative or their amount and
nature unprovable.").
121. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
122. See supra Part III.C.
123. If we view each attempt to reach a bargain as a game, cooperation may be a sustainable
outcome of this potentially infinite series of identical games. This is an example of the so-called folk
theorem in game theory. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 123-26 (2d ed. 1994).
Furthermore, in our case, cooperation does not have to be sustainable. Only one cooperative play is
sufficient, because the game ends thereafter.
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If the court chooses to apply a property rule for the second time period,
we have a result that is the opposite of Boomer. In Boomer, the court de-
cided to protect the residents with a property rule followed by a liability
rule. From our analysis above, the court should, at least in the cases where
future assessment costs are high and transaction costs are low, apply a liabil-
ity rule followed by a property rule.' 4
IV. THE M-NPV MODEL APPLIED TO THE COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Boomer is the quintessential illustration of the inadequacy of common
law remedies in dealing with the problem of pollution. 25 "The courts' ten-
dency to balance hardships and deny injunctions" in nuisance suits
involving large economic disparities gives the polluter little incentive to re-
duce pollution.126 Other significant barriers in the common law affect
plaintiffs' chances of success in bringing a nuisance suit.127 The plaintiff
must prove that she is not hypersensitive to the nuisance and that she has
suffered actual physical injury rather than aesthetic impairment or risk of
injury, among other requirements."' The transaction costs involved in coor-
dinating among the potential plaintiffs poses yet another barrier to private
StS129suits. 2
Consistent with "The Great American Regulatory Tradition,"'3 ° the dec-
ades that followed Boomer saw a flurry of new federal regulations dealing
with the pollution problem that cases such as Boomer failed to adequately
address. In promulgating these environmental regulations, however, federal
agencies inevitably faced the very same issue that troubled courts from the
start: the potentially large economic disparities between risks and reme-
dies. '3 The "common sense" that "at some point it would become absurd to
124. This result is consistent with the time-limited easement theory proposed by Professors
Baxter and Altree some thirty years ago, about the same time Boomer was decided. See William F.
Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1972). Under the
time-limited easement theory, the polluter is required to pay periodic damages to residents, rather
than a lump sum permanent damage. The rationale is that the polluter will then have the incentive to
adopt pollution reduction technologies as they become economically more desirable than paying
future periodic damages. Id. at 17-21. Thus, the solution the time-limited easement theory proposes
consists of partial damages followed by a (voluntary) injunction, which coincides with M-NPV's
suggestion in this case.
125. See e.g., ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL 74-78 (6th ed. 2004).
126. Id at 76.
127. Id. See also FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW & POLICY 64 (2d ed. 1990).
128. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 64-65.
129. Id. at 65.
130. Id. (citing James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual
Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1971)).
131. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 3-4 (1999).
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pursue [minuscule environmental values] at all cost"'32 soon led to the de-
velopment of cost-benefit analysis-a technique that the common law courts
have long used implicitly when engaging in a balancing of hardships.
This Part adds two arguments to the controversy surrounding the appli-
cation of asymmetric discount rates to the cost-benefit analysis of federal
regulations. Section IV.A provides a brief account of the current state of the
debate over cost-benefit analysis and its use of asymmetric discount rates, as
well as the federal government's inconsistent positions in this debate. Sec-
tion IV.B introduces the M-NPV model to the debate and argues that,
contrary to common belief, asymmetric discounting does not lead to the
immediate adoption of a regulation that would otherwise fail the traditional
cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the application of asymmetric discounting
may suggest that, from a pure utility-maximizing point of view, the regula-
tion should be adopted at a later date, regardless of whether it produces a
positive or negative present value after asymmetric discounting. Section
IV.C uses the M-NPV model to provide a utilitarian argument for the grad-
ual adoption of increasingly stringent environmental regulations over an
extended period of time.
A. The Debate over Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Asymmetric Discounting
Professor Sunstein divides the debate regarding cost-benefit analysis and
its role in the federal government into two generations. The "first genera-
tion" debate concerns the desirability of cost-benefit analysis. Traditionally,
environmentalists perceive cost-benefit analysis as antienvironment and op-
pose its use in federal environmental regulations, while regulated industries
generally support it.'33 Indeed, some existing federal environmental regula-
tions would not pass the cost-benefit analysis, and many more proposed
regulations might fail. 34 Even so, because of the neutral appearance and
intuitive appeal of cost-benefit analysis,'35 this generation of debate regard-
ing cost-benefit analysis "appears to be terminating with a general victory
for its proponents."'
' 36
According to Professor Sunstein, the "second generation" debate, con-
cerning practical issues such as how to value life and health in implementing
132. Id. at 3.
133. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. CoLo. L. REv. 335, 335
(2006).
134. In a 1996 study, 20 out of the 33 regulations examined failed to pass the cost-benefit
analysis. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitment to Regulate Risk, in RISKS,
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 154-55 (Robert W. Hahn
ed., 1996). A more recent survey of 136 final and proposed regulations using government-supplied
cost and benefit estimates showed that, of the 106 final regulations studied, 60 had negative net
benefits; of the 30 proposed regulations, 17 had negative net benefits. ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING
REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 40-41, 88 n.30 (2000).
135. Driesen, supra note 133, at 337.
136. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at xi.
2068 [Vol. 105:2035
Now, Later, or Never
cost-benefit analysis, is currently underway. 37 Although his characterization
of the current state of debate is not without critics, 38 Professor Sunstein ap-
pears to be at least partially correct. Instead of continuing to question the
desirability of cost-benefit analysis, environmental scholars recently have
turned to examining the discount rate used in cost-benefit analysis. They
have argued that a lower discount rate-zero, in some cases-must be used
in connection with the calculation of future nonmonetary environmental and
health benefits.
39
The logic behind the argument for a lower discount rate is clear. For a
regulation to pass the NPV test, it must have a positive net present value.'
40
If the recurring future benefits of an environmental regulation, such as a
cleaner environment and longer and healthier human lives, are translated
into a dollar amount lower than the monetary costs associated with the regu-
lation, the only way to arrive at a positive net present value is to argue for a
lower discount rate for such benefits such that the present value of the bene-
fits may nevertheless outweigh the present value of the costs, which are
discounted at a faster pace.
The argument in favor of a lower discount rate for the environmental
benefits of federal regulations finds plenty of theoretical support. Under the
descriptive approach, because regulations are government undertakings, the
risk associated with the future benefits of any environmental regulation is
most likely less than the risk associated with future costs.' 4' Furthermore,
the discount rate applicable to the benefits produced by government regula-
tions (a weighted average of the lower consumption discount rate and the
higher investment discount rate) is necessarily lower than the investment
discount rate (the rate applicable to the costs of government regulations)
which consists primarily of the compliance cost incurred by private indus-
tries. The prescriptive approach offers even stronger support for discounting
environmental benefits at a lower rate. The nonmonetary nature of environ-
mental benefits implies that neither the opportunity cost of capital nor pure
time preference are applicable when it comes to discounting environmental
benefits: foregoing one unit of clean air does not lead to two units of clean
air sometime in the future, and one unit of clean air today and one unit of
clean air twenty years from now seem equally important. In addition, our
ethical obligations to ensure a clean environment for future generations also
mandate that environmental benefits should be discounted at a lower rate,
possibly zero.
43
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 15, at 192 ("[Blut I for one am still stuck on the normative
question, wondering whether CBA is a good idea to begin with.").
139. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 15; Revesz, supra note 20.
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, from a practical point of view, it may be considerably easier
and more effective to convince policymakers that a lower discount rate is
more appropriate than to convince them that a higher value should be put on
human lives. First, there is far less consensus on the appropriate choice of
discount rates than there is on the value of a statistical life. Because scholars
generally agree that there are many factors that affect the appropriate choice
of discount rate and that making such a choice is a difficult task, regulatory
bodies of the government are often given substantial leeway in choosing
their own discount rate so long as they can justify the choice.'44 The value of
a statistical life, on the other hand, is consistently estimated at between $1.5
million and $6.1 million by the federal agencies . 4 Any substantial deviation
from these estimates should include "an explanation of departures from the
numbers thus indicated"' 46 Second, it is more effective for environmentalists
to argue for a decrease in discount rate than for an increase in the value of
life. For example, a mere 50% decrease in the discount rate from 0.1% to
0.05% will result in a 100-fold increase in the present value of a human life
100 years from now, far greater than any reasonable increase in the valua-
tion of a statistical human life per se.
The federal agencies' response to the theory of asymmetric discounting
has largely been positive. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
for example, often chooses high discount rates (between 7% and 10%) for
regulatory costs and low discount rates (around 3%) for benefits. 47 Like-
wise, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, noting the
intergenerational and governmental nature of its regulations, adopts a 3%
discount rate for certain long-term regulatory benefits but discounts all other
costs and benefits at 7%. 14 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration also applies a lower rate when discounting the benefits of its
regulation but chooses to use a higher discount rate for the associated
costs.
149
The federal courts' reaction to the agencies' application of asymmetric
discount rates, however, has been less than welcoming. When a defendant
agency fails to perform asymmetric discounting in its cost-benefit analysis,
courts have generally refused to adopt the plaintiff's position that the agency
should not have discounted benefits at the same rate as costs and have
largely deferred to the decision of the agency to discount benefits and costs
144. Morrison, supra note 5, at 1356-57.
145. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 78-79.
146. Id. at 77.
147. Morrison, supra note 5, at 1361.
148. See Requirements for Notification, Evaluation and Reduction of Lead-Based Paint Haz-
ards in Federally Owned Residential Property and Housing Receiving Federal Assistance, 64 Fed.
Reg. 50,140, 50,186-87 (Sept. 15, 1999).
149. National Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 456 (Jan. 5, 1996).
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at identical rates. "° On the rare occasion that a court had the opportunity to
review a case where an agency, namely the EPA, did apply asymmetric dis-
count rates, that court flatly rejected the EPA's differential treatment of costs
and benefits of its regulation, even though the benefits of the regulation in
question were primarily human lives saved, and opined that "[b]ecause the
EPA must discount costs to perform its evaluations properly, the EPA also
should discount benefits to preserve an apples-to-apples comparison.''
B. The M-NPV Model Applied to Federal Environmental Regulations
It is unclear whether the courts will renew their reluctance to accept
asymmetric discounting the next time a federal regulation adopting this ap-
proach comes up for judicial review, especially in light of the scholarly work
that has since emerged advocating the use of asymmetric discount rates in
regulatory analysis. What appears inevitable, however, is that even if the
courts reverse their position and approve asymmetric discounting, the
agency that has promulgated the regulation in question must be prepared to
justify the decision to adopt the regulation immediately rather than at some
future time. While asymmetric discounting may result in a positive net pre-
sent value for that regulation, it also implies that the question of "if' is
converted into a question of "when."
As demonstrated in the three scenarios presented in Part II, introducing
asymmetric discount rates in a cost-benefit analysis does not immediately
save a regulation that would otherwise fail a cost-benefit analysis, contrary
to the implicit belief of the many environmentalists who argue for a lower or
zero discount rate for environmental benefits. Even if the net present value
of the regulation is positive after applying the asymmetric discount rates, as
in Scenario 2, M-NPV suggests that, from a pure utility-maximizing point of
view, the optimal choice is to adopt the regulation at a future time, not im-
mediately. The only way to argue for immediate adoption based on pure
economic grounds is to prove both that the nonmonetary benefits are under-
valued in the original calculation and that if the dollar value of such benefits
is correctly adjusted upwards, the recurring benefits of the regulation, undis-
counted, exceed its recurring costs, as is the case in Scenario 1. Even if
environmentalists eventually overcome the courts' initial skepticism towards
asymmetric discounting, those who advocate the discounting of environ-
mental benefits at a lower rate to save stringent regulations on pure utility-
maximizing grounds face the subsequent challenge of justifying the imme-
diate adoption of a regulation on the same grounds, which may be
exceedingly difficult to do.
150. See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
the Department of Interior did not act unreasonably in following the OMB guidelines and discount-
ing future benefits).
151. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218 (5th Cir. 1991). The court's rea-
soning that the EPA must also discount nonmonetary benefits if it discounts regulatory costs has
subsequently been criticized by legal scholars. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2053 (1998).
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While the advocates of asymmetric discounting may have unintention-
ally set up a future hurdle in justifying the immediate adoption of more
stringent environmental regulations, they have gained ground in another
direction, perhaps also unintentionally. Regulations that produce a negative
present value even though their environmental benefits are discounted at a
lower rate-or not discounted at all-still will not pass the NPV test and
still will not be treated as worthwhile from an economic point of view. Bar-
ring some other considerations that would recommend a "[divergence] from
the conclusion recommended by CBA,"'52 such regulations will not be
adopted at all. With asymmetric discounting, however, the M-NPV model
provides the environmentalists a powerful argument that a policymaker
should not pass over such regulations entirely but should instead give them
favorable consideration for possible future adoption. Under asymmetric dis-
counting, a regulation that produces a negative net present value if adopted
immediately will necessarily yield a positive net present value if adopted at
a future date, as shown in Scenario 3.
Therefore, the true consequence of applying an asymmetric discount
rate in a cost-benefit analysis is the somewhat intermediate position between
immediate adoption and total rejection of an environmental regulation. On
one hand, asymmetric discounting suggests that regulations that produce a
positive net present value should not be adopted immediately if the positive
value is solely the result of discounting the environmental benefit at a lower
rate than the monetary cost. On the other hand, asymmetric discounting
suggests that regulators should not simply reject an environmental regula-
tion with a negative net present value but should instead consider the
possibility of adopting the regulation but deferring its enforcement, adop-
tion, or activation to a later date.
C. An Economic Justification for Progressively
More Stringent Regulations
In addition to identifying the double-sided consequence of asymmetric
discounting, M-NPV analysis can also provide a strong economic justifica-
tion for progressively more stringent environmental regulations. As shown
in Part II, asymmetric discounting replaces the question of "if' the regula-
tion should be adopted with the question of "when." But if the policymaker
has a number of regulatory options of varying degrees of stringency and can
only choose one to implement at a time, she must decide "when" to adopt
"which" regulation.
The traditional NPV approach fails to adequately address this type of
question. In fact, it is almost always biased towards less-stringent regula-
tions because the requirement that benefits exceed costs "constitutes a one-
way ratchet, systematically reducing the stringency of regulation in all cases
where it has any influence at all."' 5 3 As the regulation becomes more strin-
152. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at xi.
153. Driesen, supra note 133, at 388.
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gent, both its costs and benefits will increase, but its costs will increase at a
faster pace than its benefits due to the law of diminishing marginal returns,
and at some point the costs of the regulation will exceed its benefits. As a
result, "this ... criterion [that benefits exceed costs] requires a reduction in
stringency" and "never requires an increase in stringency."'' 55 Moreover, be-
tween two regulations that have identical net present values, the traditional
NPV approach will almost certainly favor the one that achieves this net pre-
sent value with lower costs and a better benefit-cost ratio, that is, the
regulation that is less stringent.
Applying M-NPV analysis, it turns out that the utility-maximizing
course of action is to adopt the regulations in the order of their stringency,
from the least stringent to the most stringent, over an extended period of
time, rather than to always favor the least stringent regulation. Two steps are
involved in reaching this conclusion. First, given a less-stringent regulation,
R, and a more-stringent regulation, R2, we can determine the optimal times
of adoption for each of these regulations independently. Since the increase
in costs from R, to R2 outpaces the increase in benefits, t,", the optimal time
of adoption for R, will be smaller than t2*, the optimal time of adoption for
R2. Thus, R, the less-stringent regulation, should be adopted earlier than R2,
as shown in Figure 9. Second, we observe that there is a point in time, t',
when the marginal net present value of R2, computed as the present value of
R2's marginal benefit minus the present value of R2's marginal costs, begins
to exceed that of R, as shown in Figure 10. This is because the marginal net
present value of R2 increases at a faster pace than that of R, In other words,
from this point onward, R2 is more desirable than R,. Thus, t' is the optimal
time to switch from R, to R2 to ensure maximum utility.
154. See id. ("[Tihe cost-benefit ratio will improve as the regulation becomes less stringent
and get worse as it gets more stringent.").
155. Id.
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A simple example helps illustrate the point. Suppose that an agency is
considering two alternative options, R, and R 2, to achieve a regulatory goal.
R, is the less stringent of the two and saves one life at a cost of $8 million
per year. R2 is more stringent than R, and consequently saves two lives per
year. Its cost, however, is $10 million per life saved, due to the law of dimin-
ishing marginal returns. Thus, R, costs $20 million per year. Further assume
that the value of a statistical life is estimated to be $6 million and discounted
at an annual rate of 5%. The financial cost associated with the environ-
mental regulation, on the other hand, is discounted at 10%. Finally, assume
2074
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that the benefits and costs associated with these regulations are perpetually
recurring. Consequently, the benefit of R, discounted to present value, is
$120 million; its cost, discounted to present value, is $80 million. Similarly,
R 2 has a discounted benefit of $240 million and a discounted cost of $200
million. Which regulation should the agency adopt and at what time?
The traditional NPV and the M-NPV approaches produce drastically dif-
ferent results. Under the traditional NPV approach, both R, and R 2 have a
net present value of $40 million, but R, costs less than R 2 although both pro-
duce benefits with the same net present value. Because R,'s overall benefit-
cost ratio is higher than that of R2, the less-stringent R, will always be fa-
vored over R 2 and will be adopted immediately. M-NPV focuses on the
marginal net present value of the regulations instead of their overall benefit-
cost ratios. It suggests that R, should be adopted at some future point and
that R 2 should be adopted at some point after R,. The optimal time to adopt
R, is when its marginal net present value becomes positive, approximately in
the sixth year, as shown in Figure 11. The optimal time to adopt R 2 is when
its marginal net present value becomes higher than that of R, approximately
in the fourteenth year, as shown in Figure 11.
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The M-NPV analysis can be further applied to more than two regula-
tions to show that the regulations should be adopted in ascending order of
their stringency over an extended period of time. Thus, not only is cost-
benefit analysis not inherently biased towards less-stringent regulations, it
is, in conjunction with the M-NPV model, actually a "one-way ratchet,"
systematically increasing the stringency of regulations over time.
2075June 2007]
2076 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:2035
CONCLUSION
The use of asymmetric discount rates in the economic analysis of law
leads to the conclusion that resources should be time divided between com-
peting activities. In the context of nuisance remedies, this implies that the
courts should consider issuing a suspended injunction in cases where tradi-
tionally a permanent damage would have been awarded. When performing
cost-benefit analysis for federal regulations, applying asymmetric discount
rates will not lead to the immediate adoption of regulations that are not oth-
erwise regarded as economically worthwhile or that are overly stringent.
Instead, it implies that such regulations, regardless of whether they pass the
NPV test after the lower discount rate is applied to the benefit side, should
be adopted on a future date rather than immediately. Finally, asymmetric
discounting implies that progressively more stringent regulations must be
adopted over time.
Now, Later, or Never
APPENDIX
Given a constant and perpetual benefit streams S,, let b, be the annual
recurring benefit this stream produces once adopted, and r, be the continu-
ous discount rate applicable to this type of future benefits, 0 < <- The
marginal present value of S, at time t is
u, (t) = ble-r!,
and the present value of S, between any two points in time, t. and tb
, 
is
Vl(taJtb) = fu(x)dx =--(e- -e-r ' )
'a r
For a second constant and perpetual benefit stream S2, let b2 be the an-
nual recurring benefit this stream produces once adopted, and r2 be the
continuous discount rate applicable to this type of future benefits,
0 _ r2 < I. Thus, the marginal present value of S2 at time t is
u 2 (t) =b 2 e-r2t,
and the present value of S2 between ta and t, is
V2 (ta tb)-- b2  - er2b ).
r2
We further stipulate that S2 is discounted at a lower rate than S, that is,
0< r2 < r <1,
and that S, and S2 are mutually exclusive, that is, only one stream may be
adopted at any time. Therefore the benefit of one stream becomes the cost of
the other.
Proposition 1-1. There exist annual recurring benefits, b, and b2, such
that the net present value of S2, defined as
NPV = v2(0,oo)-vI(0,oo),
is positive.
Proof
v(0, oo)= L(eO -e-)= bl;
r r
v2 (O, 00) = L2 (eO - e-- ) b2
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Therefore, the net present value of S2 is positive if
b2 r > br 2 .
Proposition 1-2. There exist annual recurring benefits, b, and b2, such
that the net present value of S2 is negative.
Proof Omitted. The net present value of S2 is negative if b2 r < bI r2 .
Proposition 2. If b,>b2 , then there exists t'>O such that ul (t*) = u2 (t*).
Proof Suppose ble -r = b2e - r2t
Then nb. -rt* = nb2  r 2t*
and t* = Ink -Inb2
r - r2
Because b > b2 and r > r2, we have
, In b - In b2S - r >0.
Proposition 3. If we first adopt S, and switch to S2 at time t, and call the
time of switching that maximizes the net present value of this course of ac-
tion top
, 
, top > 0, then for bl>b, topt = t* ; for b,<b2, top, = 0.
Proof The net present value produced by this course of action, M (t), is
the sum of the net present value of S, up to time t and the net present value
of S2 thereafter.
M'(t) = NPV(O,t) + NPV(t,oo) --vl (0,)- v2 (0,t)+ v 2 (too)- V1 (t,oo).
M (t) = (Il- e rl'  2 (-e 2 )+ b-- 2 e-
r r2  r2  r
M(t) =f br:.j-2(jLer"-b Le-r2tj,
dM(t) = 2(b1ert _b 2er21).
dt
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dM (t)Setting dt =0, we have
dt
bIe - r t = b2e- r2' "
From Proposition 2, we know this is satisfied if and only if
= Inb -Inb2
t~t -
r, - r2
Thus, t" is the only critical point of this function. We also have:
d 2 Mr(t) - ble - r + r2b2e - '
dt
2
and
d 2 Ml(t*)_*d M(t* 
- ble-r"* +r 2b 2er"tdt 2
At t*, be - r't =b 2e - r2t > 0 and 0 <r 2 < r, < 1, we thus have
d 2M(t*) .
dt
2
Therefore t* is the maximum point of the function M (t).
, lb I -mlb 2
If b1 < b2, then t - < 0, and therefore topt = 0. We
r - r2
also note that this situation is described by M-NPV Scenario 1. Thus, the
only requirement for M-NPV Scenario 1 to hold is that bI < b2 and
r > r2.
On the other hand, if bI > b2, then t -nb > 0, and
r - r2
S Inb -In b2 > .top t 0
r - r2
In addition, we note that the net present value of switching at time 0 is
simply the net present value of S2, that is,
M(0)= NPV.
Therefore, if the net present value of S2 is positive, that is, b2 r > b r2
(see Proposition 1-2), then M(O)>O, and together with the fact that top > 0,
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this describes M-NPV Scenario 2. The condition for Scenario 2 to hold is
therefore b, > b2 , r > r2, and b2 r > b, r2.
We similarly derive the conditions for M-NPV Scenario 3 to hold, that
is, b, > b2 , r > r2 , and b2r < b, r2 . (Steps omitted).
